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NOTES
Criminal Procedure-Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners
and the Fourth Amendment
Collateral attack on state criminal convictions in federal courts
has long been a controversial subject. Those who favor limited collat-
eral review are concerned with the need for finality in criminal pro-
ceedings, the burden placed on federal courts by the number of peti-
tions, and the diminution of state responsibility and independence within
the federal system. Those who advocate broad collateral review believe
that these concerns are outweighed by the need for a procedure through
which uniform enforcement of federal law is maintained and the need
for a method of redressing incarcerations obtained in violation of the
prisoner's rights. Since the early 1950's the number of grounds avail-
able to a petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has increased. Indi-
cations are, however, that this trend is reversing.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,1 Justice Powell, in a concurring opin-
ion, joined by two other Justices2 and supported by a third,3 wrote: "I
would hold that federal collateral review of a state prisoner's Fourth
Amendment claims . . . should be confined solely to the question of
whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise and
have adjudicated the question in state courts.' '4  The case involved the
habeas corpus petition of a state prisoner who asserted that he was be-
ing held in violation of his fourth amendment rights. The state argued
first that petitioner's rights had not been violated, and secondly, that the
Court should reconsider its holding in Kaufman v. United States5 and
1. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
2. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined with Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion. Id. at 250.
3. Justice Blackmun in a separate concurring opinion wrote: "Although I agree
with nearly all that Mr. Justice Powell has to say in his detailed and persuasive con-
curring opinion, post, p. 250, I refrain from joining it at this time because, as Mr.
Justice Stewart's opinion reveals, it is not necessary to reconsider Kaufman in order
to decide the present case." Id. at 249.
4. Id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stewart joined in a dissenting
opinion written by Justice Harlan in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S- 217, 242-
43 (1969), in which he stated that fourth amendment claims should be heard in col-
lateral proceedings for federal prisoners only under limited circumstances. Thus it
would appear that at least five members of the Court favor limiting review of fourth
amendment claims to some extent.
5. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
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no longer allow fourth amendment claims to be asserted as a ground for
federal habeas corpus relief." The Court rejected petitioner's fourth
amendment claims and declined to consider whether Kaufman should
be overruled. 7 However, Mr. Justice Powell used this opportunity to ex-
press his views on the continued validity of Kaufman."
BACKGROUND
The present rule is that fourth amendment claims, whether filed by
state or federal prisoners, are cognizable in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, and the trial court's application of the exclusionary rule must
be examined as it would be on direct review. The federal court is not
bound by the state determination of the petitioner's claims and must
hold its own evidentiary hearing if no adequate hearing on the issue
was provided in the state courts. This rule has been codified,10 but it is
basically the product of three major cases."
6. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
7. 412 U.S. at 249 n.38.
8. Id. at 250-51. It is necessary to point out at the outset that this is not
the only attack on the scope of federal habeas corpus. Proposed Senate Bill 567, now
in Senate committee, would restrict the grounds for federal habeas corpus to constitu-
tional violations of only those rights which have as their primary purpose the protec-
tion of either the fact-finding process at the trial or the appellate process on appeal.
S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Thus, not only would fourth amendment violations
no longer be cognizable, but also claims of violations of Miranda rights and Wade
violations would be unreviewable in habeas proceedings. For an extensive treatment
of this proposed bill see Note, Proposed Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation, 61 GEo. L.i. 1221 (1973).
9. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970). That subsection provides that the state deter-
mination of the facts is presumed to be correct unless it appears:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the fact-finding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of
his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the
State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which
the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a deter-
mination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual de-
termination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal
court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes
that such factual determination is not fully supported by the record. ...
11. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
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In the landmark case of Brown v. Allen, 12 the Supreme Court held
that claims of constitutional violations would present valid grounds for
federal habeas corpus even if the state courts had fairly and fully adjudi-
cated them. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion wrote,
"The State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consid-
eration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have mis-
conceived a federal constitutional right."13  Implicit in the opinion is a
recognition that habeas corpus provides a procedural device through
which federal rights are vindicated and state enforcement of those
rights is supervised.14
In Fay v. Noia'5 this recognition was more formally expressed.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, saw as the basic purpose of ha-
beas corpus the vindication of due process rights.16 To the Court
"[ilts root principle is that . . . government must always be account-
able to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment . ... ."1 Federal ha-
beas corpus was seen as an established procedure which provides a rem-
edy for any restraint considered to be contrary to fundamental rights.
Thus as due process rights evolve and expand, the writ becomes avail-
able as a remedy for the violation of those rights.
In Fay the Court did not expressly rule that claims of fourth amend-
ment violations would be cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. The underlying rationale, however, was that habeas corpus was
391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The rule could possibly be consid-
ered to be the outgrowth of four major cases with the inclusion of Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1969), discussed infra note 17.
12. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
13. Id. at 508.
14. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 H~AR. L. REV.
1038, 1061-62 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. At the time of the Brown
decision the exclusionary rule was not applicable to the states and thus was not a part
of the due process rights to be protected. However at the time of the Fay decision
Mapp v. Ohio had been decided.
15. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In this habeas corpus proceeding the Court considered
a state prisoner's claim that his confession was coerced, even though the prisoner had
not directly appealed to the state appellate court within the applicable time period.
The Court held that the requirement that a state prisoner must exhaust his state rem-
edies before applying for a writ meant only that the prisoner must exhaust the state
remedies remaining available to him at the time of the filing of the habeas petition.
16. Id. at 402.
17. Id. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-19 (1963), decided the same
day as Fay, the Court set down guidelines that the district courts should follow in
deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding. It
was made clear that the court could not automatically accept the state determination
of facts and that in all situations it was the duty of the federal judge to apply indepen-
dently the federal law. Such a holding has added significance in the fourth amendment
area because in such claims the law and fact are often intertwined.
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available as a remedy for any violation of due process. At the time of
the decision, the fourth amendment and its exclusionary rule had been
applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 8 Several later cases made it clear that a state prisoner's
fourth amendment claims could properly be heard in federal habeas
corpus proceedings. 19
A conflict developed in the circuits, however, with regard to
whether a federal20 prisoner could raise such claims collaterally.2" A
majority of the circuits held that they could not because collateral relief
was not meant to take the place of direct appeal. 2 The rationale for
this holding was best expressed in Thornton v. United States.2 8 In that
case the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that, unlike other constitu-
tional violations, the claims of illegal search and seizure do not impugn
the integrity of the fact-finding process, nor do they challenge the evi-
dence as being inherently unreliable.24 Thus, the court reasoned, the
enforcement of the exclusionary rule is meant solely as a deterrent de-
vice.25 The court felt that since deterrence is not furthered by enforce-
ment of the rule in post-conviction proceedings, fourth amendment
claims should not be available to a federal prisoner seeking collateral
relief.2 To distinguish this position from that of the state prisoners,
18. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
19. Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967). In these cases state prisoners raised fourth amendment claims through habeas
corpus, and the Court decided those claims on the merits without a full discussion of
the appropriateness of habeas corpus for raising them.
20. It is the purpose of this note to analyze the issues involved when a state
prisoner asserts fourth amendment violations in a federal court. This is a separate
problem from that of a federal prisoner who collaterally attacks his conviction on the
same grounds, and different considerations are involved. The discussion of the cases
involving the availability of collateral attack for federal prisoners asserting fourth
amendment violations is helpful however, because those cases reveal the reasoning be-
hind the Court's holdings in the cases which do involve state prisoners. In Schneckloth
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, was primarily concerned with the availability
of the writ for state prisoners asserting fourth amendment claims, however he recog-
nized that Kaufman dealt mainly with federal prisoners. 412 U.S. at 250-51.
21. The existence of this conflict was recognized in Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217, 219-21 (1969).
22. E.g., United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 1967); Springer v.
United States, 340 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
23. 368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The Thornton case did not rule out fourth
amendment claims completely but said they could be heard only in exceptional circum-
stances. Id. at 826-29. In Kaufman the government adopted the reasoning of this
opinion and pressed its arguments before the Supreme Court. Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1969).
24. 368 F.2d at 827-28.
25. Id. at 826-28.
26. Id.
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who were allowed to raise fourth amendment claims, the court pointed
to the necessity for adjudication of the state prisoner's claims in a fed-
eral forum. 7
In Kaufman v. United States28 the Supreme Court held that federal
prisoners could assert fourth amendment violations collaterally and re-
affirmed the availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners
who assert fourth amendment claims. The Court rejected the argument
that such relief was available to state prisoners solely because of the
need for a federal determination of their claims. The Court stated that
the availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners who assert
fourth amendment violations was premised largely "on a recognition
that the availability of collateral remedies is necessary to ensure the in-
tegrity of the proceedings at and before trial where constitutional rights
are at stake. 29 The Court argued that collateral relief "contributes to
the present vitality of constitutional rights whether or not they bear on
the integrity of the fact-finding process." 30  The argument that the
scope of federal habeas corpus should be curtailed by the need for fi-
nality was rejected.81
THE OPIMON
Justice Powell begins his opinion by briefly reviewing the history
of habeas corpus. He concludes that recent decisions have transcended
the traditional purpose of habeas corpus and have diminished the im-
portance of finality in state criminal judgments.8 2  He identifies the pur-
pose of the writ as the prevention and redress of "unjust" incarcera-
tions s3 To him "unjust" incarceration refers to the imprisonment of
innocent people,34 not to the imprisonment of those people who are in
fact guilty but whose convictions were obtained in violation of their con-
stitutional rights. Since many prisoners who assert fourth amendment
violations are not innocent in fact, 35 Justice Powell concludes that they
27. Id. at 828-29.
28. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
29. Id. at 225.
30. Id. at 229.
31. Id. at 228. The Court also had occasion to mention the exclusionary rule,
saying that its enforcement could not depend upon the guilt or innocence of the person
on trial. The exclusionary rule was seen rather as necessary to the protection of all
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 229.
32. 412 U.S. at 256.
33. Id. at 257-58.
34. Id.
35. Id. Arguments could possibly be made against Justice Powell's assertion that
prisoners who assert fourth amendment claims are rarely innocent. However, it is the
1974]
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are not unjustly incarcerated and, federal habeas corpus should not
be available to them.36
Justice Powell then examines the societal costs of collateral re-
view of fourth amendment claims.17 He argues that collateral attacks
constitute an unwise allocation of judicial resources.38 When such re-
views are made, federal courts needlessly duplicate the efforts of the state
judiciary. Also habeas corpus petitions place a time consuming burden
on the federal courts that deprives civil litigants of prompt adjudication
of their claims. A second cost he identifies is the near total defeat of
society's interest in a rational point of termination for criminal litiga-
.tion. 9 Society, he argues, can no longer afford to constantly re-exam-
ine every conviction to insure the absence of constitutional error. This
practice defeats the deterrent effect of the criminal law by making
slow and uncertain the prospect of punishment for the convicted de-
fendant. In Justice Powell's view, the present scope of collateral re-
view also prevents effective rehabilitation by encouraging the prisoner
to try to overturn his conviction rather than to admit his guilt. A third
cost Justice Powell identifies is the imbalance within the federal system
created by the present scope of habeas corpus, which places upon the
federal courts a disproportionate share of the responsibility for adjudicat-
ing federal claims.4 0  This imbalance works to decrease the respect ac-
corded the state courts and leads to tension between state and federal
judicial systems.
Having assessed the societal costs of extending federal habeas cor-
pus to include fourth amendment claims, Justice Powell then examines
the societal benefits it provides. 41 He frames his analysis in terms of the
exclusionary rule, which, he asserts, has deterrence as its sole purpose.4"
He feels that this purpose is not significantly furthered by collateral en-
forcement of the exclusionary rule because such enforcement is too far
removed from the everyday actiyities of law enforcement officers. At
this point Justice Powell feels that the evils of the exclusionary rule
purpose of this note to explore the question of whether collateral review of fourth
amendment claims is justified even if we assume the petitioner is guilty. As will be
discussed later, habeas corpus procedure has come to serve functions which are inde-
pendent of the question of guilt or innocence.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 259-66.
38. Id. at 260-61.
39. Id. at 261.
40. Id. at 263.
41. Id. at 266-67.
42. Id. at 266-68.
[Vol. 52
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
more than outweigh its benefits.4  He also argues that since the habeas
proceedings generally involve close and intricate problems that pose dif-
ficulties for the courts and that are beyond the understanding of many
policemen, the deterrent aspect of the rule is not furthered by adjudica-
tion of these issues. 44
AN ANALYSIS
These arguments, though convincing, do not present an impregna-
ble attack on the scope of federal habeas corpus. The major weak-
ness of the opinion lies in the assertion that the purpose of the writ is
to prevent incarceration of innocent people. Historically, the writ in-
volved more than the question of innocence.45  Justice Powell's asser-
tion ignores the role federal habeas corpus has played in vindicating due
process rights and ensuring that the states adequately enforce them.46
In a slight and inadequate concession to this role, he reserves to the
federal courts the power to examine the record in order to determine
whether the prisoner has been given a fair opportunity to raise his
claims.47  This concession may in one sense prevent the incarceration
of innocent people by ensuring that the opportunity to raise fourth
amendment claims is available. However, if one assumes, as Justice
Powell does, that those who assert such claims are usually guilty, then
the concession is inconsistent with the purpose he proposes for the writ.
The adjudication of claims asserted by guilty persons would do nothing
to prevent the incarceration of the innocent.
By proposing that the federal courts be removed from the consid-
eration of the merits of state prisoners' fourth amendment claims, Jus-
tice Powell fails to acknowledge the important functions those courts
perform. First, the federal courts provide a separate and a federal
43. Id. at 269.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 257. Justice Powell is aware of this fact but feels that in light of
present demands on the judicial system, tying the writ to guilt or innocence is justified.
46. Vindication of due process rights is a recognized purpose of federal habeas
corpus. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963); Wright & Sofaer, Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75
YALE L.J. 895, 895-96, 958-85 (1966); Note, 61 GEO. LU., supra note 8, at 1229-
30; Developments, supra note 14, at 1060-63. Respondent Bustamonte pressed these
arguments in his brief arguing that historically the expansion of grounds for federal
habeas corpus has corresponded to the evolving standards of due process. He also
urged that there is a great need for uniform application of federal law. Brief for Re-
spondent at 22-35, Scbneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Respdndent's Brief].
47. 412 U.S. at 250.
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forum, isolated from the question of guilt, in which the sole issue is
whether the prisoner's rights were violated.48 Such a forum is necessary
because the closeness of state judges to the enforcement of state sub-
stantive law may unconsciously affect their disposition of the constitu-
tional claims.49 Another major advantage of federal courts is their ca-
pacity to supervise state court determinations to ensure uniform enforce-
ment of federal law.50 Access to federal adjudication would otherwise
not be possible in many cases on direct review because of the small
number of writs of certiorari granted by the Supreme Court.' 1 The federal
courts relieve the Supreme Court's caseload in this regard, and the ha-
beas cases that do eventually reach the high court usually contain evi-
dence not found in the often incomplete records available to the Su-
preme Court on direct review.52 Such functions are important in fourth
amendment claims because the factual findings are often determinative
of the legal question presented in the case.
Justice Powell's argument that the present scope of federal habeas
corpus places an unduly heavy burden on the federal courts and is an
unwise allocation of judicial resources is also unconvincing. Federal
courts allocate relatively little time to habeas corpus petitions" and
rarely require extensive evidentiary hearings since most of the petitions
are decided at the pleading stage.54  The prisoner is seldom successful,
and only a small number of state retrials are required.5 5 Also, in recent
years the number of petitions filed has begun to decrease. 56 Assuming
48. Developments, supra note 14, at 1057-61.
49. Respondent's Brief at 29-30; Note, 61 GEO. L.J., supra note 8, at 1251; De-
velopments, supra note 14, at 1057-61.
50. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 46, at 897-98; Note, 61 GEo. L.J., supra note
8, at 1226; see Developments, supra note 14, at 1061-62.
51. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437 (1963); Wright & Sofaer, supra note
46, at 897 n.11; Note, 61 GEo. L.J., supra note 8, at 1251.
52. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963); Wright and Sofaer, supra note 46, at
897.
53. Note, 61 GEO. LJ., supra note 8, at 1246.
54. LaFrance, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: Who's Responsible?
58 A.B.A.J. 610, 612 (1972).
55. Id. 1971 DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
CouRTs ANNuAL REPORT 132 shows that in about ninety-six percent of the prisoner
petition cases the relief prayed for was not granted. This does not mean that the
remedy is unnecessary, however. The value of habeas corpus is that it is a procedural
device which insures state compliance with due process rights. Its value can not be
assessed in terms of the number of state retrials granted for that would assume that
if habeas corpus were removed the state would be as careful as they now are in enforc-
ing federal rights.
56. In fiscal 1970 state prisoners filed 9,063 petitions for writs of habeas corpus
in federal district courts. In fiscal 1971 the number was 8,372 and in fiscal 1972,
7,949. 1972 DIRECTOR Or ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrTED STATES CouRTs
640 [Vol. 52
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however that habeas petitions do constitute a heavy burden on the
courts, there are alternative means to relieve the burden that do not re-
move the protection provided to the fourth amendment by habeas cor-
pus. These include using standardized forms, referring the petitions to
federal magistrates, and, more importantly, providing the state prisoner
with counsel to aid him in presenting his claim in a more efficient man-
ner.57  The ultimate solution is for the states themselves to provide
post-conviction proceedings that emphasize adjudication on the mer-
its.58 Justice Powell's solution would create an even greater misalloca-
tion of judicial resources, for if federal courts are precluded from exam-ining the merits of fourth amendment claims, the Supreme Court may be
pressured into granting more writs of certiorari in order to ensure state
compliance with and uniform enforcement of federal law.
Contrary views also exist on Justice Powell's contention that the
present scope of federal habeas corpus significantly diminishes the value
of the finality of state convictions. The present habeas procedure
makes several concessions to that interest in its operation and practical
effect. First, section 2254 establishes the presumption that the state
hearings have been adequate and casts the burden of proving deficien-
cies upon the petitioner.6 0 Second, except for sufficiency of evidence
claims, federal habeas corpus does not purport to relitigate the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence, but is restricted to constitutional claims and
violations of federal laws. 6' Third, state convictions are rarely over-
turned.12  Finally, district courts may refuse to hear the petition if the
petitioner has voluntarily waived his claim in the state proceeding. 3
Arguments that habeas corpus does not create undue friction be-
tween state and federal courts have been made. The habeas procedure
presently reduces this tension since the prisoner must exhaust his state
ANNUAL REPORT Table 19, at 117. The report suggests that the reasons for the decline
are improvements in state post conviction remedies and the availability of counsel for
the indigent defendant. The decline is expected to continue. Id. at 116. Justice Pow-
ell notes this decrease but does not consider it significant enough to relieve the burden.
57. United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 166-70 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Shapiro,
Where Have All the Lawyers Gone?, 9 ThiA. No. 3, 41 at 42 (1973).
58. See LaFrance, supra note 54, at 613.
59. The Court in Fay and in Kaufman felt that the traditional concerns for final-
ity should not be allowed to outweigh the federal policy behind vindicating constitu-
tional rights. The argument concerning finality is not a new one, but it has increased
importance because of the value placed upon it by several members of the present
Court.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970), quoted in note 10 supra.
61. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 612.
62. See notes 55-56 supra.
63. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963).
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remedies prior to application for a writ, thereby giving the state courts
an opportunity to correct their mistakes.04 Further, friction between
the two systems may not be inevitable.65 Friction may be primarily a
function of the individual judge's psychology, and thus to a large ex-
tent could be overcome subjectively. 66 There are, in addition, institu-
tional alternatives for relieving friction that do not require the limitation
of the scope of federal habeas corpus.67 These alternatives seek to re-
lieve friction by reducing the total number of petitions and by improv-
ing the co-operation and communication between the federal and state
judges.
Also, it must be noted that the solution proposed by the opinion
has the potential to create even more friction. By asking whether the
state has provided an adequate opportunity to have the claim heard,
friction is not alleviated, rather it is created at a different point in
the system. For example, when a federal judge is presented with a
claim that he feels the state court has wrongly decided, but he is con-
vinced that the court provided an adequate hearing, he would face a
problem the solution of which would necessarily create tension. If he
denies the writ, his own decision is in conflict with his perception of the
federal right. If the federal judge grants the petition, his decision in-
forms state judges that not only have they misconceived a federal right,
but they have also failed to provide an adequate opportunity for the
right to be heard. This solution would seemingly create more tension
than the mere reversal of the state court's decision. Also, much of the
friction, which Justice Powell feels habeas corpus creates, is not caused
by habeas corpus but rather by disagreement with the federal right as-
serted by the petitioner.
Arguments may also be presented against the position that there
is little value in enforcing fourth amendment claims in a federal habeas
64. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 46, at 902-03. The authors also suggest that
the requirements that the petitioner assert a non-frivolous claim, the petitioner be in
custody, and the petitioner not be detained on other adequate grounds, all work to
relieve the tension between the systems. Id.
65. Hopkins, Federal Habeas Corpus: Easing the Tension Between State and
Federal Courts, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 660, 670 (1970).
66. Freund, Remarks at Symposium of Federal Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. REV.
27, 30 (1964).
67. These alternatives include: (1) having the state courts briefly state the claims
of the prisoner and the reasons for their denial; (2) establishing a data bank which
would contain the record of all applications of each prisoner in each system; (3) giving
recognition to the state courts' function as factfinders by holding evidentiary hearings
in state courts; (4) reducing the number of petitions by denying retroactive effect to
newly evolved standards of due process; (5) having an open system of communication
between the two systems. Hopkins, supra note 65, at 670-75.
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corpus proceeding. First, it cannot be so readily assumed that the ex-
clusionary rule's sole function is to deter.68 One of the reasons the
Court gave for its application to the states was to ensure the integrity
of the judicial process. 9  There was a desire to ensure that the courts
would not sanction illegal government activity by admitting illegally
seized evidence. Secondly, enforcement of the exclusionary rule in ha-
beas corpus proceedings does provide additional support for the rule's
deterrent effect.7° By keeping in the minds of the attorneys and state
judges that what they are doing is subject to a likelihood of federal
court review, they will be more likely to handle those claims with added
care and respect. Thus by inducing the attorneys and trial judges to
maintain high standards in dealing with police conduct and fourth
amendment claims, the deterrent aspect of the rule is strengthened.
CONCLUSION
The concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte is a covert
attack on the exclusionary rule. If the views expressed in the opinion
are carried to their logical conclusion and habeas corpus is restricted
to only those constitutional claims that affect the determination of guilt
and the reliability of the fact-finding process, habeas corpus will have
lost its place as the procedural device for the vindication of due proc-
ess rights. Uniform enforcement of constitutional rights will be ham-
pered while no significant improvement in federal and state relations
will occur. Though the opinion does not reflect present law, it does in-
dicate that the Supreme Court, as currently composed, is dangerously
close to curtailing the scope of federal habeas corpus.
E. G. WALKER
68. The Court in Kaufman recognized that collateral review serves to secure the
integrity of the proceeding whether or not the constitutional right bears on the reliabil-
ity of the factfinding process. 394 U.S. at 229. It has been suggested too that the
rule gives opportunities for judicial review demonstrating the importance of the consti-
tutional right it protects. See Note, 61 GEO. L.J., supra note 8, at 1232.
69. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
70. The Kaufman Court found it necessary to enforce the exclusionary rule col-
laterally saying that the rule was necessary to protect all citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Court also distinguished enforcement of the rule collater-
ally from the denial of retroactive effect to the rule, finding that collateral enforcement
added to the integrity of the proceedings at and before trial while retroactive effect
did not. 394 U.S. at 229; see Freund, supra note 66, at 30; Note, 61 GEo. L.J., supra
note 8, at 1251-52.
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